The Role of Information in Governing the Commons: Experimental Results by Janssen, Marco et al.
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Janssen, M. A. 2013. The role of information in governing the commons: experimental results. Ecology and
Society 18(4): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05664-180404
Research
The Role of Information in Governing the Commons: Experimental
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ABSTRACT. The structure and dynamics of ecosystems can affect the information available to resource users on the state of
the common resource and the actions of other resource users. We present results from laboratory experiments that showed that
the availability of information about the actions of other participants affected the level of cooperation. Since most participants
in commons dilemmas can be classified as conditional cooperators, not having full information about the actions of others may
affect their decisions. When participants had more information about others, there was a more rapid reduction of the resource
in the first round of the experiment. When communication was allowed, limiting the information available made it harder to
develop effective institutional arrangements. When communication was not allowed, there was a more rapid decline of
performance in groups where information was limited. In sum, the results suggest that making information available to others
can have an important impact on the conditional cooperation and the effectiveness of communication.
Key Words: common pool resource; communication; conditional cooperation; information; institutions
INTRODUCTION
The appropriation of common resources is well studied
(Poteete et al. 2010). The basic question that has been
considered is under what conditions do resource users
maintain their common resources at sustainable levels. From
decades of research, we know that there are many factors
influencing the ability to self-govern the commons (Ostrom
1990, 2005). Critical factors include the implementation of
monitoring and enforcement and the mutual trust relationships
within the community of resource users (Poteete et al. 2010).
These factors facilitate long-lasting repetitive actions that are
commonly understood and well monitored. 
What has not been explicitly studied is the role of the visibility
of the state of the ecology and the actions of the resource users
on the ability of groups to solve collective action problems. If
monitoring and enforcement and trust are such critical factors
in solving collective action problems, visibility of the resource
users’ actions and the state of the ecology are expected to have
an effect on the governance of the commons.  
We report on a series of laboratory experiments with a spatially
explicit resource in which we manipulate the visibility of the
resource and the actions of the participants. As such, we can
test the effect of full or limited information on the state of the
environment and the actions of the participants on the
performance of collective action. We investigate whether
participants create institutional arrangements that fit the level
of visibility they experience. Although there are limits to the
use of laboratory experiments, it may provide insights about
observations from individual case studies. 
An explicit study on the role of visibility may contribute to
the understanding of the “problem of fit,” that is, the interplay
between institutional arrangements and ecological dynamics
(Young 2002, Folke et al. 2007). Earlier studies show that
effective institutional arrangements are based on where, when,
and how to harvest (Schlager 1994, Wilson et al. 1994, Ostrom
2005), which also facilitate knowledge about when and where
to monitor. Seeing somebody in the wrong spot at the wrong
time with the wrong gear will be a clear violation of
institutional arrangements even if no direct harvesting
activities have been observed. 
We provide some illustrative examples from case studies that
show that the ecological conditions affect the visibility of the
state of the ecology and the actions of other resource users. In
certain cases, innovative institutional arrangements have been
crafted in order to overcome the high cost of information
collection. 
When fishers harvest fish from a large territory, farmers
withdraw water from a long irrigation canal, or villagers
harvest from a large forest, there is no way that they can see
what everyone else is currently doing. Many resource
management systems developed by local users define when,
where, and how authorized harvesters may harvest. Such rules
are easy to monitor and enforce, and if there is more confidence
that people are following the rules, others will follow them
too. For example, in Maine, lobster fisheries have evolved
rules that allocate permanent spots within a bay to specific
fishers (Acheson 2003, Wilson et al. 2007). In many farmer-
managed irrigation systems, a particular time is allocated to a
specific farmer depending on their location along the canal
and the size of their farm (Maass and Anderson 1986, Burns
1993, Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002). Finally, in some of the
alpine commons, farmers from the valley work together at a
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set date to cut an agreed upon number of trees (Netting 1981,
Stevenson 1990). Then together they carry the timber and
allocate it into approximately equal stacks. The stacks are then
randomly assigned to eligible households. Trees cannot be
harvested at any other date. 
As the examples of the case studies illustrate, the structure and
dynamics of the social-ecological system affect the
availability of information on the state of the resource system.
This affects the ability to collect information to feed back into
the governance system. Not only is information about the state
of the ecology difficult to collect, it might be that the behavior
of resource users is difficult to monitor in some systems. If
fishers fish on the open sea on their own and come back with
their catch, there is only limited information on the actual
harvesting practices. For example, by-catch might not be
reported. As a consequence of the difficulty of monitoring
fishers, some fisheries include an official monitor on each
vessel (e.g., Alaska Fisheries Science Center 2011). 
We further consider past related studies on experiments of
common resources that provide the context for the
experimental design we use to test the effect of different levels
of information on the state of the resource and the actions of
participants. We then discuss the experimental design that is
used in this study, and the results of the experiments in the
subsequent section. Finally, we conclude with a section on the
role of information on collective action in governing common
resources.
PAST EXPERIMENTS ON COMMON POOL
RESOURCES
Controlled experiments have been used to test specific
hypotheses on self-governance of the commons that were
inspired by observations from the field (Ostrom et al. 1994).
The benefit of controlled experiments is the ability to test
specific mechanisms. Over the years, lab experiments have
challenged conventional theories in economics. People are
often found to be conditional cooperators rather than selfish
and rational actors (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Frey and Meier
2004). This implies that participants tend to cooperate if others
do too. Furthermore, “cheap talk”—the ability to
communicate without the option to make binding agreements
—has a major positive effect on cooperation (Ostrom et al.
1994). Finally, costly sanctioning—giving up earnings to
reduce the earnings of others—is preferred by participants,
and it increases the level of cooperation (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
In controlled experiments, one can control what information
is made available to the participants. We extend a set of
experiments on a dynamic, spatially explicit resource (Janssen
et al. 2010). We discuss the specifics of the experimental
environment in the next session. For now, it is important to
note that we test the effect of the amount of information
available regarding the state of the resource and the actions of
other players on the ability of groups to self-govern their
common resource. In order to define some hypotheses, we
briefly discuss findings in the experimental literature on
common resource dilemmas on the availability of
information. 
A few recent publications explored the consequences of
varying the information available to the participants. When
more information about the actions of others is available to
participants, we see lower levels of cooperation in most
studies, since more details reveal the existence of free riders
(Nikiforakis 2010, Villena and Zecchetto 2010). When the
information is focused on the intentions of conditional
cooperators in the group, we see that more information leads
to higher levels of cooperation (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit
2006, de Oliveira et al. 2009).  
The level of information about the actions of others affects the
level of cooperation. This seems related largely to information
about the strategies participants are using. Previous studies
did not include communication in which people could
coordinate their activities. Communication has been found to
increase the level of cooperation, but there are different
possible explanations. Is communication effective due to the
formation of group identity or due to participants making
commitments to cooperate (Orbell et al. 1988, Shankar and
Pavitt 2002, Buchan et al. 2006)? The explanation that
communication leads to a better understanding of the
experiment is not likely (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994,
Brosig et al. 2003). If communication is effective through the
development of group identity and by allowing participants to
make commitments on cooperation, reducing the level of
information about the state of the resource or the actions of
participants should not affect the results of the experiment.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiments focused on understanding the effect of
limited information regarding resource availability and the
actions of other participants on collective action in a social-
ecological system. We investigated a real-time dynamic
resource-harvesting setting (Janssen et al. 2008, 2010). The
reason for Janssen et al. (2010) to include spatial and temporal
dynamics in a laboratory experiment was the empirical
observation from case study analysis that spatial and temporal
dynamics are critical features of ecological systems that affect
the specific institutional arrangements (Janssen et al. 2007).
To test findings from observations of social-ecological
systems in controlled experiments, we needed to include more
complex dynamics of the common resource (Janssen 2010).
The software used for this experiment is open-source and
available at http://commons.asu.edu/. Detailed instructions
are available in the appendix of this article. 
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In our experiments, participants appropriated renewable
tokens from a shared renewable resource environment (Fig.
1). Each group was made up of five participants who shared
a 29 x 29 grid of cells. In the initial state, 25% of the grid space
was filled with tokens, thus 210 tokens. The avatars were
initially placed in the middle row of the screen with equal
distances between the avatars. In order to collect a token, a
participant had to position their avatar on the location of that
token and explicitly press the space bar. Participants were
allowed to collect tokens for four minutes. Each token
harvested was worth US$0.02. We distinguished two
situations by how the information on the screen was presented.
In the first situation, participants had complete information on
the spatial position of tokens and could watch the harvesting
actions of other group members in real time. Furthermore, the
players saw the total harvested tokens of all participants at the
top of the screen. In the other situation, we showed only the
tokens and avatars within a radius of six cells. This represented
a situation of reduced information availability. The
environment outside this radius was depicted as black. Only
when another avatar was within the radius could one see the
total amount of harvested tokens of this other player at the top
of the screen.
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the experimental environment. The
green diamond-shaped tokens are the resource units. The
dots are the avatars of the participants. The participant sees
his/her own avatar colored yellow, and the avatars of others
are colored blue. The white circle represents the limited
vision. The yellow player sees only the information within
the circle. The environment outside the circle is black.
Every second, empty cells had the potential to generate new
tokens. The probability that a given empty cell would generate
a token was density-dependent on the number of adjacent cells
with tokens. The probability pt was linearly related to the
number of neighbors: pt = p · nt/N where nt was the number of
neighboring cells containing a green token, N was the number
of neighboring cells (N = 8), and p = 0.01. If an empty cell
was completely surrounded by eight tokens, it would generate
a token at a higher probability than an empty cell that abutted
only three tokens. At least one adjacent cell must have
contained a token for a new token generation to occur.
Therefore, if participants appropriated all of the tokens on the
screen, they had exhausted the resource and no additional
token generation would occur. By designing the environment
in this manner, we captured a key characteristic of many
spatially dependent renewable resources. The optimum level
of appropriation depended on the initial starting conditions
and probabilistic renewal of the empty cells. Janssen et al.
(2010) estimated the optimal group-level harvest amount to
be 665.  
We defined the following hypotheses to guide our design and
analysis of the experiments: 
• Hypothesis 1: With limited vision, participants will
overharvest the common resources at a slower rate than with
full vision. 
Previous experiments have shown that most participants in
social dilemma situations can be identified as conditional
cooperators (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001, Frey and Meier
2004). Conditional cooperators are more likely to cooperate
if they expect others will do so too (de Oliveira et al. 2009).
The participants’ decisions might be influenced by their
expectations of what others will do. In various previous
studies, providing more information so that free-riding can be
observed reduced cooperation (Nikiforakis 2010, Villena and
Zecchetto 2010). When we reduced the visibility of others, we
expected this would take longer to detect free-riding behavior.
As such, we expected a lower level of harvesting when there
was a limited vision. 
• Hypothesis 2: Communication increases cooperation, and
there is no difference in the effect of full vision versus limited
vision on periods with communication. 
Communication has been found to increase cooperation,
probably due to the formation of group identity or the
expressed commitment to cooperate (Orbell et al. 1988,
Ostrom et al. 1994, Shankar and Pavitt 2002, Buchan et al.
2006). Communication via chat messages was allowed for four
minutes before the harvesting period for groups with both
limited and with full vision. As such, changing the visibility
would not affect the expected results.  
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Table 1. Experimental design.
Name Number of groups
(individuals)
Vision Practice Periods 1–3 Periods 4–6
NC-C 6 (30) Radius Individual
resource
No communication (NC) Communication (C)
C-NC 7 (35) Radius Individual
resource
Communication (C) No communication (NC)
NC-C 5 (25) Full Individual
resource
No communication (NC) Communication (C)
C-NC 4 (20) Full Individual
resource
Communication (C) No communication (NC)
To test Hypothesis 1, we performed experiments with limited
vision and with full vision. To test Hypothesis 2, we had to
perform periods with and without communication for the same
groups. We decided to use both possible designs, namely first
periods without communication and then periods with
communication, and then in the reverse order. When we started
without communication, we should have seen an increase in
harvesting when communication was allowed. If we found
differences in the effects of limited and full vision in rounds
with communication, this might have been caused by the
differences in the groups’ experiences in rounds without
communication. Therefore, we also included experiments in
which we started with communication, and then after a number
of periods switched to no communication. 
We tested four treatments in an AB-BA, AC-CA format in
which each treatment consisted of three periods of four
minutes without communication and three periods of four
minutes with communication using text chat. We tested the
effect of information availability by doing experiments with
full vision and with limited vision (a radius of six cells).
Furthermore, we varied when agents could communicate in
order to test Hypothesis 2. 
Table 1 shows the four different treatments, and for each
treatment, the number of groups that participated is listed. The
first treatment was the condition in which participants had
limited vision during the whole experiment and could not
communicate during the first three periods of the experiment.
In the last three periods of the experiment, players could
communicate for four minutes by sending text messages
before each period started. The second treatment was the same
as the first treatment, except that we had communication
during the first three periods and not in the last three periods.
Janssen et al. (2010) found that communication has a long-
term effect, even after communication is removed. We tested
whether this held with limited vision. The third treatment was
the same as the first treatment, except that participants could
see the whole screen instead of the information within a radius
of six cells only. Comparing treatment three with treatment
one enabled us to test the effect of limited vision. The fourth
treatment was the same as the second treatment, except that
players could now see the whole screen. 
Each experimental session consisted of participants harvesting
in six periods of four minutes each. Groups that quickly
appropriated all of the tokens on the screen exhausted the
resource and had to wait for time to expire before continuing
to the next period. Communication among participants
occurred during text-chat sessions. During four-minute
sessions, participants could send public text messages to others
in their group. Each participant was identified by an avatar
number, which remained the same throughout all periods, and
allowed individuals to associate the witnessed actions of other
group members during a harvesting period with the
discussions during the communication sessions.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
General statistical results
During the Spring 2010 semester, 115 participants took part
in 23 group experiments at the Tempe campus of Arizona State
University (ASU). All participants were undergraduate
students at ASU who were recruited by sending out invitations
to a random sample from a database of more than 1500
potential participants in social science experiments. The
average age was 19.8 years, and the average earning was
US$14.28 for a one-hour experiment. 
Fig. 2 shows the number of tokens harvested on average for
each treatment in the first period of the experiment. Groups
with communication harvested more tokens than groups
without communication, which is in line with earlier findings
(Ostrom et al. 1994, Janssen et al. 2010). With communication,
groups could coordinate and define informal rules on how to
harvest the resource. Groups with limited vision harvested
more tokens than groups with full vision. This is support for
Hypothesis 1 and suggests that in groups with limited vision,
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participants who have high expectations of cooperation do not
realize until late into the period that some participants are
harvesting faster than anticipated. In groups with full vision,
the expectations are quickly adjusted, thereby leading
participants to follow a higher rate of harvesting.
Fig. 2. Average number of tokens collected by groups in the
first period of the first treatment. NC: no communication; C:
communication; LV: limited view; FV: full view. The
standard deviation of the groups is depicted as error bars.
Fig. 3 shows the average resource size for each treatment for
each period. For example, at the right top (B) is the treatment
NC-C-FV. This means that there was no communication in
the first three periods of the experiment, while there was full
vision during the whole experiment. Each period, the resource
got depleted more quickly (the green line is below the red line).
When communication was allowed, there was an increase in
the resource size. This was caused by coordination and
informal rule-crafting among the participants, which reduced
the level of overharvesting experienced at the start of the
experiment. At the end of each of these periods, the
participants depleted the resource since they had agreed that
it benefited them to collect all the tokens from the resource
before the period ended. Participants knew the length of the
period, and the seconds left during a period were displayed at
the top of the screen. Participants could earn more as a group
if they did not harvest quickly at the beginning, which allowed
the resource to grow. 
When participants started with communication, they did not
wait collectively to let the resource grow, but they also did not
harvest the resource rapidly. Over the periods, the resource
level stayed at a higher level. When communication was not
possible anymore, on average the resource levels did not
change much. The results with full vision are in line with those
of Janssen et al. (2010). 
The resource dynamics were different when there was limited
vision. If participants started with periods without
communication, the decline of the resource seemed to be
slower compared to the full vision case. Over the periods, the
rate of decline increased. When communication was allowed,
the resource remained at a higher level but not as high as with
full vision. When participants started with communication in
a limited vision treatment, there was a significantly lower
resource level when communication was removed compared
to the full vision treatment. 
Fig. 4 shows similar trends as discussed above in terms of the
number of tokens harvested. Communication seemed to lead
to an increase in performance over the periods, especially
when there was full vision, while not being able to
communicate led to a reduction of performance over the
periods when vision was limited. 
We used a number of nonparametric tests to test for statistical
differences between the treatments. To test the effect of full
versus limited vision, we used a two-tailed Mann-Whitney
test. We applied the test to the group earnings during the first
period for the sample with full vision and the sample with
limited vision, and found a significant difference (p = 0.08).
This means that the periods with full vision led to lower
numbers of tokens being collected compared to the first period
of experiments with limited vision. To test the effect of
introducing communication, we used the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test to compare the earnings in rounds three
and four. We found a significant increase in tokens earned for
full vision (p = 0.06) and limited vision (p = 0.03). We used
this test because it is suitable to test whether two related
samples (earnings of the same group in different rounds) are
different. 
Was there a significant difference between the communication
groups in period one whether they experienced full or limited
vision? Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, we found no
significant difference (p = 0.34). This supports Hypothesis 2.
Communication led to higher levels of cooperation; thus,
stopping communication may also reduce the harvest levels.
We used the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to
assess the effect of not allowing communication after period
three, and we found in both treatments a significant decrease
in performance between period three and four for limited
vision (p = 0.08) and full vision (p = 0.06). Hence, stopping
communication led to a lower level of earnings in subsequent
periods. 
The nonparametric test compared samples but did not assess
the effect of the treatments over different periods. Fig. 4
indicates that there were learning effects due to multiple
periods of communication or multiple periods without
communication. To test this, we used a multi-level mixed
effect linear model to control for the possibility that groups
had different error distributions. The value of χ2 in Table 2
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Fig. 3. Resource availability at given times. The diagrams show the average remaining level of the resource for the groups of
each treatment. Each diagram shows a treatment condition, and each line represents a particular period. The treatment is a
combination of two sets of three periods of a specific condition. The names for these conditions are noted in the upper left of
each display: NC: no communication; C: communication; LV: limited view; FV: full view. A treatment A-B refers to
condition A for the first three periods and B for the last three periods. The colors and shapes referring to data of each period
are noted in the upper right.
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suggests this had a significant effect, so it was important to
use a multi-level model. A linear model was used to test the
effect of different treatments over the periods on the level of
group harvesting. The model basically consisted of a number
of dummy variables. It took into account whether
communication was possible or not, whether there was limited
vision or not, and whether groups had already communicated
or not. For each sequence of three rounds in a certain condition,
we tested whether there was a learning effect. If there was a
learning effect, each round would have had a predictable
change in the group’s harvest.
Table 2. A multilevel mixed-effects linear regression
performed with the gross number of tokens that groups
collected during each period. The independent variables are a
set of dummy variables: whether participants could
communicate during the period, whether participants could
have communicated during the first three periods, and whether
participants’ vision was limited. Learning is tested by the
effect of experiencing the same condition during multiple
periods by including a dummy variable that indicates whether
it is the first, second, or third time in this condition. Learn is
1 for round 1, 2 for round 2, and 3 for round 3. Learn is also
1 for round 4, 2 for round 5, and 3 for round 6. Learn (Com
& FV) is not zero when there is communication and full vision.
The dummies for communication and limited vision (Com &
LV), and the rounds without communication (No Com & FV)
and (No Com & LV) are defined in the same way.
 
Independent
variables
Dependent variable: tokens harvested by
group (std. error)
Constant 299.605*** (27.770)
Communication 59.720*** (22.541)
Past Communication 98.409*** (15.299)
Limited Vision 35.938 (32.048)
Learn (Com & FV) 52.043*** (9.379)
Learn (Com & LV) 20.278*** (8.200)
Learn (no Com &
FV)
-6.320 (9.379)
Learn (no Com &
LV)
-29.816*** (8.200)
Total Chat
- Log Likelihood 717.494
Number of Decision
Periods
132
Wald χ2 298.33 (P < 0.001)
χ2 63.74 (P < 0.001)
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.001
The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 2. It
shows that communication in the current and past rounds had
a significant effect. The effect of past communication was
important. It means that if communication was not possible,
but there had been communication in a previous period, there
was an increase of about 90 tokens in that round. This suggests
that communication had a lasting effect on the group
dynamics, and confirms earlier findings that communication
might be important due to the formation of a group identity.
The positive effect of a limited vision was not significant. Fig.
4 shows that there might be positive and negative
consequences of limited vision. The group earnings were
higher in the first rounds when vision was limited, but the
effect of communication was less sustainable when
communication was not allowed anymore. 
The learning effects differed for each context. When there was
full vision, each period of communication led to a significant
increase of about 52 tokens harvested (Learn [Com & FV]).
The effect of communication was less positive when there was
limited vision since the earnings increased by only about 20
tokens each period. Hence, communication was more than
twice as effective if there was no limit to the information
available on the actions that people actually performed.  
When participants could not communicate, there was a
different effect in groups with full and with limited vision.
When vision was limited, there was a rapid reduction of the
earnings of about 29 tokens per period. There was only a small,
insignificant reduction per period when participants had full
vision.  
How do we interpret the results and what might be an
explanation? When groups had limited vision or full vision,
communication enabled them to discuss effective strategies
and develop a group identity. However, when the vision was
limited, participants could not verify whether others were
keeping their promises. Participants also knew they were not
being observed when they did not see other avatars on the
screen. As a consequence, promises made might have been
more likely to be broken. Other studies have shown that the
perception of being monitored leads to a higher level of
cooperation (Bateson et al. 2006, Burnham and Hare 2007).
As a consequence, we should have been able to observe a
difference in individual decisions when participants were
observed by others or not, as we evaluate in EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS: Harvesting decisions. 
If participants were largely conditional cooperators, we should
have seen that the level of information available had a
significant effect. Our analysis confirmed this and showed that
this was especially the case when we had a number of periods
in the same condition. Communication was more effective
with full vision, and not being able to communicate was
damaging for the group when the vision was limited. With full
vision, actions could be monitored and confirmed, and there
were fewer opportunities for breaking promises.
Harvesting decisions
When we looked in more detail at how participants harvested
tokens, we detected interesting patterns. For each harvesting
event, we counted the number of tokens around the cell that
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was harvested. When we plotted the distributions for the full
vision treatments, we saw that for experiments where the
periods started without communication, the distributions were
biased toward cells with a small number of tokens on the
neighboring cells (Fig. 5). It seems that the occurrences of
tokens with many neighboring tokens were reduced quickly
so that only tokens with none or a few tokens on neighboring
cells could be harvested. When communication was allowed,
the distribution shifted toward a larger number of tokens on
neighboring cells. This meant that participants were more
deliberate about harvesting tokens in locations that stimulated
renewal.
Fig. 5. Distribution of the number of tokens in the
neighboring cells at the moment a token is harvested.
Distributions are given for each round. Both figures are for
the full vision treatments. NC: no communication; C:
communication.
When experiments started with communication periods, we
saw a different pattern. Harvesting was more focused on
tokens with many neighboring tokens. The distribution was
biased toward cells with a higher number of neighboring
tokens than in the no communication periods in the no
communication-communication (NC-C) treatments. Interestingly,
the distribution did not change when communication was no
longer allowed. The norms governing when to harvest tokens
seemed to persist. 
When we looked at the treatments with limited vision, we saw
a similar pattern, however, with one interesting difference.
There was a sharp decline if the experiment started with
communication periods (Fig. 6). In fact, the distribution of the
number of tokens on the neighboring cells in period 6 (C-NC)
became similar to the distribution of the first period in
experiments that started without communication (NC-C) (p =
0.05, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). This was not the case for
the full vision experiments. The hypothesis that both
distributions (period 1 of NC-C-FV and period 6 of C-NC-
FV) were the same was rejected using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (p = 0.19).
Fig. 6. Average number of tokens in neighboring cells at the
moment of harvesting for each treatment in each of the six
rounds. NC: no communication; C: communication; LV:
limited view; FV: full view.
When we tested the distributions of period 1 for the
experiments that started without communication for limited
vision and full vision, the hypothesis that they were the same
was rejected (p = 0.12, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).  
In the limited vision treatment, we could distinguish two
different harvesting situations: one where the harvester could
be seen by other participants who were within the vision radius,
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and one where the harvester had no other participant within
the vision radius. We tested whether the distributions were
different among the harvesting events in which others were
within the field of vision or not. Fig. 7 shows the average
number of tokens on neighboring cells. The average number
of tokens was lower when participants could not be observed
by others. This was especially significant in periods with
communication. This indicates that participants were more
eager to harvest tokens when there were only a few tokens
around if others could not see their actions. We expected that
communication would lead to a certain norm on when to
harvest. But when participants could not be seen by others,
they were often tempted to harvest tokens with a lower number
of neighboring tokens than had been established in the norm.
Fig. 7. Average number of neighboring cells with tokens at
the moment a token is harvested. For each round, the
average number is given when participants can be seen by
somebody else or not. At the bottom of the figure, the level
of significance of the difference between the two
distributions is provided: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P <
0.001. NC: no communication; C: communication.
Communication analysis
All the chat messages were read, and the type of
communication was very similar to that found in earlier studies
with this experimental environment (Janssen 2010, Janssen et
al. 2010). In most groups, participants discussed not to “eat”
single tokens in order to allow regeneration of the resource.
Furthermore, they coordinated to divide up the resource in five
equal parts: four corners and one in the middle. Some groups
decided not to harvest at the beginning of the period to allow
the resource to grow. Most groups agreed to get “crazy” around
the final 30 seconds in order to collect all the remaining tokens
on the screen. No differences were observed in the types of
informal rules the participants created. But as seen in the
observed behavior, the level of compliance with the informal
arrangements was lower in the experiments with limited
vision.
DISCUSSION
The spatial and temporal dynamics of ecological systems
affect the information available on the condition and use of
the common resources. Information availability might be an
organizing factor to explain the problem of fit between
institutional arrangements and ecological dynamics. 
Our series of lab experiments show that information
availability has a significant impact on outcomes. When
experiments started without communication, there was a
higher level of earnings when participants had limited vision.
This result can be explained by the often-observed conditional
cooperation behavior of participants, i.e., participants
cooperate if they expect that others will do so as well. If
participants expect others will harvest at a modest rate, limited
information will delay the observation that some of the
participants seem to harvest more.  
In most social dilemma experiments, most participants can be
classified as conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al. 2001),
and this explains observed cooperation in actual social-
ecological systems (Rustagi et al. 2010). If conditional
cooperation depends on expectations about the behavior of
others, such as compliance to social norms, the quality of
information is a key component to explain the level of
cooperation. If players were making decisions unrelated to the
actions of others, such as those who are pure egoists and pure
altruists, we would not see an effect from limited vision on
our experimental results. But there was a difference. With
more information, participants harvested faster when there
was no communication. This might be explained when
participants expected a higher level of cooperation and
adjusted their expectation based on the observed behavior of
others. 
The effect of limited vision might not be the same for each
participant. Although we did not have independent
information on the level of conditional cooperation for each
participant, we expect that unconditional free riders had a
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relative benefit with limited information compared to those
who were conditional cooperators. Since unconditional free
riders can benefit for a longer time from the lower harvest
levels of others, they will receive a relative higher share of the
group harvest. This distributional effect of limited information
would be interesting to explore more systematically with an
agent-based model. 
Although communication is a key factor in increasing
cooperation in common pool resource experiments, there are
different possible explanations varying from improved
understanding to a sense of belonging to a group. A change of
vision will not affect the impact of communication if the effect
of communication is about improving the understanding of
the experiment or deriving a sense of belonging to a group. In
our experiments, groups with communication learned to
increase their earnings at a slower rate if vision was limited.
This suggests that the effect of communication relates to other
types of information that can be derived. An explanation is
that communication provides opportunities for coordination
and expectation formation on the actions of others. When
information is limited, informal arrangements made during
the communication periods cannot be monitored. The lack of
monitoring may reduce the level of compliance. In fact,
participants harvested more single tokens when they could not
be seen by others. Hence, the effectiveness of making informal
arrangements depends on the ability to monitor the actual
behaviors. 
The experiments showed that limited information had an effect
on the performance of groups, although we did not see
participants crafting different informal regulations with
different levels of information. A few groups started to group
together in the middle of the screen so that they could verify
that everyone was waiting for the resource to grow at the start
of the period. We expect that limitations on information
availability will stimulate institutional arrangements that are
easier to verify, such as the use of certain technology. More
specific experiments need to be done to confirm this. 
To conclude, the quantity and quality of information on actors
and resources might become an organizing framework to study
the fit between institutions and ecological dynamics.
Experiments and formal models might be used to determine
the conditions that affect the performance of groups in solving
collective action problems. In the current information age,
looking at the problem of governance of social-ecological
systems from an information perspective might also lead to
novel methods of improvement. Does sharing of information
on resource extraction, such as photos of harvest activities or
GPS tracking of resource users, help increase cooperation? If
resource users are largely conditional cooperators, sharing
information on cooperative behavior might reinforce
cooperative behavior.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5664
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Appendix 1: Experimental protocol 
 
In this appendix you find the information participants receive during the experiments. It includes 
of text on the screen of the experiments, as well as some screen shots of the software. ). The 
software used for this experiment is open-source and available at http://commons.asu.edu. 
As you will see allowed participants to vote for allowing to sanction each other at a cost. We did 
not include sanctioning in the discussion of the paper since groups did not vote in favor for using 
sanctioning. If costly sanctioning would be allowed, participants could click on the number of 
the avatar they would like to sanction. Two tokens will then be removed from the earnings of the 
other participant, at a cost of one token to the person who sanction. Costly sanctioning was 
elected in two of the three rounds in only one group. This was in the treatment of full vision in 
rounds two and three with communication. We decided to exclude the results of this group and 
not include costly sanctioning in the analysis. We verified the effect of this omission, and found 
not a significant effect of excluding this group from the analysis on our conclusions. 
Welcome Screen Instructions 
 
Welcome to the experiment. The experiment will begin shortly after everyone has been assigned 
a station.  
Please wait quietly and do not close this window or open any other applications.  
 
 
General Instructions  
Welcome. You have already earned 5 dollars by showing up at this experiment. You can earn 
more, up to a maximum of 40 dollars, by participating in this experiment, which will take about 
an hour to an hour and a half. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions as well 
as the decisions of other people in this room during the six rounds of the experiment.  
You appear on the screen as a yellow dot . You move by pressing the four arrow keys on 
your keyboard. You can move up, down, left, or right. You have to press a key for each and 
every move of your yellow dot. In this experiment you can collect green diamond shaped tokens 
 and earn two cents for each collected token. To collect a token, move your yellow dot over a 
green token and press the space bar. If you move over a token without pressing the space bar 
you do NOT collect that token.  
 
The tokens that you collect have the potential to regenerate. After you have collected a green 
token, a new token can re-appear on that empty cell. However, the rate at which new tokens will 
appear depends on the number of adjacent cells with tokens. The more tokens in the eight cells 
around an empty cell, the faster a new token will appear on that empty cell. In other words, 
existing tokens can generate new tokens. To illustrate this, please refer to Image 1 and Image 
2. The middle cell in Image 1 denoted with an X has a greater chance of regeneration than the 
middle cell in Image 2. When all neighboring cells are empty, there is no chance for 
regeneration.  
 
Image 1 Image 2 
  
 
 
Your vision is limited in this experiment. The area that is visible to you will be shaded.  
Practice Round Instructions  
You will now have four minutes to practice with the experimental environment. The decisions 
you make in this round will NOT influence your earnings. At the At the beginning of the practice 
round 25% of the cells are occupied with green tokens. The environment is a 13 x 13 grid of 
cells.  
 
During this practice round, and only during this practice round, you are able to reset the tokens 
displayed on the screen by pressing the R key. When you press the R key you will reset the 
resource to its initial distribution, randomly filling half of the cells.  
 
Please do not communicate with any other participant.  
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Do you have any questions so far?  
 
Before we begin the practice round you need to answer the following questions correctly. You 
can only continue when you have answered all questions correctly. If an error is made you will 
need to answer the questions again.  
 
 
Which of the statements is incorrect? 
A. Your decisions of where to collect tokens affects the regeneration of tokens. 
B. When you have collected all tokens on the screen, no new tokens will appear. 
C. Tokens grow from the middle of the screen. 
D. In order to collect a token you need to press the space bar while your yellow dot is on a cell 
with a token. 
 
 
Which sequence of situations is not possible? 
 A 
B 
C 
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand.   
 
Round 1 instructions 
This is the first round of the experiment. The length of the round is 4 minutes. Like in the 
practice round you can collect green tokens. This time you earn two cents for each token 
collected. This time you cannot reset the distribution of green tokens.  
 
In this round the renewable resource will become five times bigger.  You will share this larger 
environment with four other players in this room that have been randomly selected.  One group's 
resource environment is distinct from the other groups.  
 
Each of you has been assigned a number from 1 to 5.  These numbers will remain the same 
throughout the experiment but you will not be able to identify which person in the room has 
been assigned which number, so your anonymity is guaranteed.   
 
The other four players will appear on the screen as blue dots  with a white number embedded 
in the dot.  On the top right corner of the screen you can see how many tokens each player has 
collected. On the top left corner of the screen you can see a clock that displays the remaining 
time in the round. 
 
[In experiments with limited vision the following is added: 
Since you can only see the resource within your vision you may neither see all the other 
participants nor all the resource units. The figure below indicates the vision range compared to 
the whole environment 
 
] 
 
 
Do you have any questions so far? 
  
 
[Rounds 2 and 3 are the same as round 1] 
 
 
 
Round 4 Instructions  
Round 4 is the same as the previous two rounds with two exceptions.  
 
Before the next round starts you can anonymously communicate by text messages for four 
minutes with the other participants in your group. You can use this opportunity to discuss the 
experiment and coordinate your actions to improve your earnings. You may not promise side-
payments after the experiment is completed or make any threats. You are also not allowed to 
reveal your real identity. We are monitoring the chat traffic while you chat.  
During the next round you will have the option to reduce the earnings of another participant at a 
cost to your own earnings.  
- If you press the numeric key 1-5 corresponding to another participant, you will reduce the 
number of tokens they have collected in this round by two tokens. This will also reduce 
your own token amount by one token. The decision whether or when to use this option is 
up to you. 
- When you reduce the number of tokens of another participant, they will receive a 
message stating that you have reduced their tokens. Likewise, if another participant 
reduces your number of tokens, you will also receive a message. These messages will be 
displayed on the bottom of your screen.  
- If your tokens are being reduced or you are reducing another participant's tokens, you 
will receive some visual cues. When you are sanctioned your yellow dot will turn red 
briefly with a blue background. The participant sanctioning you will turn purple with a 
white background.  
- You may sanction other participants as long as there are tokens remaining on the screen 
and while both you and the other participant have a positive number of tokens collected 
during the round. Each time you press the numeric key corresponding to another 
participant your token amount is reduced by one, and their token amount is reduced by 
two. Note: You can only remove tokens from a participant that is visible to you.  
 
The length of this round is four minutes.  
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Do you have any questions so far?  
 
Before the next round begins you must complete the quiz below. You can only continue when 
you have answered all questions correctly. If an error is made you will need to answer the 
questions again.  
 
Each time I press the numeric keys between 1-5 my tokens will be reduced by: 
- 0 tokens 
- 1 token 
- 2 tokens 
- 4 tokens 
 
Each time I press the numeric keys between 1-5 the number of tokens of the corresponding 
participant is reduced by: 
- 0 tokens 
- 1 token 
- 2 tokens 
- 4 tokens 
 
 
The background of your yellow dot turns blue. What does this represent? 
- You collected a token 
- Another participant is subtracting two tokens from you 
- You are subtracting two tokens from another participant 
- You are moving too fast 
 
Every time I press the numeric keys between 1-5: 
- Two tokens are subtracted from my tokens collected this round 
- One token is subtracted from my tokens collected this round 
- The background of my yellow dot turns blue momentarily 
- My yellow dot is paused for two seconds 
  
 
[Rounds 5 and 6 are the same as round 4] 
 
 
 
Screenshots of experimental environment with limited vision 
 
Practice round 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chat screen 
 
 
 
 
 
Screen during harvesting of tokens of group with limited vision from perspective of player 5. 
 
 
